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Abstract
This paper puts forward the corresponding solutions and 
suggestions through analyzing mechanisms of obtaining 
membership of farmer collectives in the normative sense, 
and aiming at the plight of obtaining farmer collective 
membership.
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1 .   MECHANISMS OF OBTAINING 
MEMBER QUALIFICATION OF FARMER 
COLLECTIVES IN THE NORMATIVE 
SENSE 
Obtaining a membership of any group, its legitimacy is 
from the voluntary of members in essence, therefore, 
obtaining a membership should be made from a potential 
member’s application that is the logical starting point in 
the normative sense. If a person hopes to get a group’s 
membership, the first way is to express the will to join 
the group, and the group’s members follow the regulation 
or the majority voting result to decide whether or not to 
accept the person. Based on the individual freedom and the 
collective autonomy, such the formation is the best style 
for the collective’s forming and decentralization. Since 
collective memberships are not resources that the country 
has the right of allocation, the legislation can not order a 
collective to accept a person or cancel a membership.
After a collective receives a potential member’s 
application, it shall follow the provisions of regulations 
and held a meeting to discuss this issue in accordance 
with the agreed procedure. Because the collective has no 
flesh, blood, and the ability to think, its decision actually 
comes from existing members’ will. These members’ will 
is in accordance with the “general will” and is represented 
by majority voting results. Collective existing members 
have the right according to the established procedures to 
decide whether to accept new members. Therefore, when 
the collective provisions of the admission of members are 
without restrictions, or a applicant has met the conditions 
required, the applicant can not be generally recognized 
that he is already approved to join the farmers’ collective.
If a collective refuses to accept some individuals 
to become its members or deprive of some individuals 
existing membership, it may lead to obvious negative 
external effect, such as a collective refusing applications 
may be against the good custom, or has a potentially 
fundamental impact on the applicant’s survival. When the 
country may pay cost to avoid death or major individual 
loss of interest, due to the damage of the collective 
behavior is not only about some individuals’ interests but 
some social interests, the state has the right to require the 
collective to make some concessions, such concessions 
may be compulsory acceptance of these potential 
members, or negotiating with these potential members 
to make compensation agreement. The main path which 
lawmakers use to interfere in contract memberships is 
to apply mandatory contract style. For conditions of 
compulsory contracting, should adopt flexible provisions. 
If the collective is refusal to fulfill the obligation of 
compulsory contracting, it should allow individuals 
to choose the compulsory execution or compensation 
according to the specific circumstances, especially when 
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the compulsory execution can only make the collective be 
false obedience, asking the compensation is much easier. 
2.  DIFFICULTIES AND SOLUTIONS
A theory should solve difficulties in the real life. In 
China countryside, even if the farmer collective member 
qualification mechanism is established based on the 
normative sense, adjusting the private law in farmer 
collective internal legal relations must also solve a 
difficult problem, namely farmer collectives have existed 
earlier than related norms, farmer collectives have not 
used the corporate form of organization and there is no 
complete member registration system at current stage, 
for those individuals who are already living in such 
farmer collectives, how to judge whether they have 
obtained memberships?
2.1  Theoretical Path to Solve the Existing 
Problem 
Once the member right system is regarded as a benefit 
allocation scheme, memberships will become the most 
important resources available for distribution. When 
the allocation scheme is considered that it can be 
designed through the detailed observation and analysis, 
then lawmakers will often consider that the designed 
allocation scheme must be according to generally 
accepted “justice” concept, and interfere in the legitimacy 
of the formation mechanism of membership. At present, 
the most opinions of the academic circles are closely 
related with the traditional thinking in China, in spite of 
having detailed differences:
Some scholars suggest to use permanent residence 
registration as the only standard to confirm the 
qualification of members, they said: “the account of 
immigration and emigration is the administrative behavior 
of a rule-based, well documented, detached from the 
interests of the members, that are used to confirm 
member identities of collectives with the greatest possible 
fairness and rationality, basically has been used in farmer 
collective membership disputes now” (Meng, 2006). Other 
scholars advocate the standards that members should have 
lived in the place for a long time and forms a de facto 
relationship of rights and obligations, or confirming the 
membership need the natural person using the collective 
land to guarantee his basic living (Wu, 2006; Han, 2005; 
Wei, Jiao, Luo, Zhang & Liu, 2006); and some uphold 
the eclectic principle, that combines the household 
registration with the above state of facts to determine 
collective memberships (Liu & Yue, 2006; Lin, 2008).
Although the Supreme People’s Court considers 
that this issue is important, uses “beyond powers” as a 
reason, and gives up the judicial interpretation for farmer 
collective member qualification system, but the eclectic 
has apparently more fans in the judicial practice. Some 
of local courts give more refined criteria, for example, 
people who are born to get local residence registrations 
should get the farmer collective member qualification 
also; people who get local residence registrations because 
of marriage, adoption relationship and so on should 
obtain the farmer collective member qualification; for 
national defense construction or other policy reasons, 
the immigrants who move into the location of the farmer 
collective should obtain the farmer collective member 
qualification; the others who move into the location of 
the farmer collective and more than 2/3 of the members 
agree to accept them as members in the farmer collective 
meeting, should obtain the farmer collective member 
qualification of the farmer collective; people who do not 
meet the above conditions but use the collective land as 
the basic living resources, also should obtain the farmers 
collective member qualification.
These different theories have something to be the 
same. They make the author remember once flourished 
implied-in-fact contract theory of German. The theory 
was proposed by German jurist Haupt in 1940s and it 
has developed for more than sixty years. The core idea 
of theory is: the principals do not need to express real 
will, according to facts in typical social behavior, can 
create the contractual relationship. Once the theory 
appeared, the German federal court implemented it in the 
Hamburg parking lot charge case. Scholars who support 
the theory divide implied in fact contract into three types: 
namely, implied in fact contracts can be based on the 
social contact, group relations, and social obligation. The 
implied-in-fact contract theory is a fundamental revolution 
against using traditional civil laws to alleviate problems 
and traditional civil laws are based on individualism legal 
thoughts. According to the implied-in-fact contract theory, 
getting rid of old ideas which can not solve the problem, 
we should have the courage to face reality and admit 
the new theory, namely in some cases, the contractual 
relationship can be established by the facts, and do not 
have to ask principals’ thoughts. Despite the contrast 
details, the above theories in essence can be regarded as 
variants of implied-in-fact contract theory, whether the 
fact of household registration, the fact of the right and 
obligation relationship existing, or the fact of using the 
collective land as the basic living resources, all these 
standards are only different at using different facts. By 
applying implied in fact contract theory, legislation can 
be based on a concept of “justice”, does not consider 
the collective will but using relevant facts as the basis, 
directly identifies whether or not those potential members 
having contractual relationships with farmer collectives.
2.2  A Method to Solve the Problem
A basic clue for solving the problem is that the mechanism 
of obtaining member qualification of farmer collectives 
should still  respect each other thoughts, namely 
membership confirmation should be based on principals’ 
will rather than lawmakers’ simple judgment of facts. 
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Legislators can use “presumption” technical means, at the 
same time, give the presumed party the right to overturn 
the “presumption” through evidence, so as to judge 
whether or not the membership exists according to the 
time and the actual situation.
“Village Committee Organization Law” may ask 
farmer collectives to make a statute, which should at 
least include the following matters: (a) the name of the 
farmer collective; (b) all rural land owned by the farmer 
collective; (c) the villager committee members of the 
farmer collective, functional authority and election 
methods; (d) the farmer collective supervision committee 
members, functional authority and election methods; 
(e) convening conditions for the villagers assembly or 
the villagers’ representatives meeting, these meetings’ 
functional authority and procedures; (f) farmers collective 
member qualification’s obtaining and loss mechanism; 
(g) farmers collective member rights and obligations; (h) 
punishment for the members of the collective; so as to 
solve the problem of judging collective membership by 
way of agreement.
If a collective does not have statute provisions for 
member qualification mechanism, “Village Committee 
Organization Law” provides the following presumption 
criteria: first, those individual farmers who have already 
exercised farmers collective member rights in fact, such 
as have attended the decision-making meeting of the 
collective and have exercised the voting right, the right 
to be elected, moreover, the farmers have signed the 
contracted management of rural land of the collective and 
these farmers’ names are indicated in the contract and so 
on. The theoretical foundation of presumption standard: 
precondition for the exercise of the rights of member is 
a membership of the farmers’ collective, since individual 
farmers are agreed by the collective to exercise rights 
of member, they should also have default membership; 
second, farmers collective member’s spouse and farmers 
collective member’s lineal relatives and their spouses. 
The fundamental reason they can make farmers collective 
member qualification is the habit of identity in village 
community, villagers children of course is considered to 
be the village people. Especially in the system of family 
planning regulation, each farmer family only have 1-2 
children in theory, ensuring farmers’ fairness expectation 
for land redistribution. Private law should confirm these 
collective internal rules that accumulated in the long-
term practical experience of life; third, by the national 
immigration, defense and other policy reasons, the 
state places farmers in the areas of farmers collectives. 
Private groups interests have to compromise with public 
interests and it is the basic reason of these farmers getting 
collective membership.
For the membership standard question, such as 
whether registered permanent residence should be entitled 
to as a presumption of the collective membership, in 
current practice, farmers who locate in areas of the 
farmers’ collectives control, really need to get the 
farmers’ collective enforcement authorities agreement 
by documents, namely, registered permanent residence 
can play a certain role, but a farmer collective agrees 
incomers living in the farmer collective controlling area 
and obtaining the collective membership is not identical. 
Therefore, household registration in the farmer collective 
control area can be used as a secondary presumption of 
obtaining membership, also need combining with other 
conditions, and we should not directly use registered 
permanent residence as a presumption of already 
obtaining farmer collective membership.
In addition, we can not presume individual farmers 
to be collective members only because these individual 
farmers use land owned by collectives as their basic 
living guarantee. According to the proper legal logic, 
after individual farmers becoming members of farmers 
collectives, farmer collectives start to have the obligation to 
provide basic survival public goods for them, not the other 
way around. And after rural land contract right circulation, 
individuals may enter the farmer collective areas to 
be engaged in agricultural production activities, these 
individuals do not have the village collective membership 
because of village habits, do not considered as members 
of these collectives. However, they must rely on these 
farmer collective farming land for a livelihood, namely 
the land owned collectives will provide actually guarantee 
for their survival, if require that farmer collectives must 
accept them as members, it is difficult to obtain agreement 
of other members, at this point, the law presumptions of 
farmer collectives having already accepted these potential 
members, apparently has no legitimacy.
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